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[W]e may hence too discover the Falsity of that Vulgar Saying, Mine and Thine are the cause of
all the Wars and Quarrels in the World. For on the contrary the Distinction of Mine and Thine was
rather introduc’d to prevent all Contention.
–Samuel Pufendorf (Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book IV, Chapter IV, Section VII)

I. Introduction
The institution of property solves a fundamental problem in human relations, namely it
defuses costly belligerence. When in direct competition for a resource, people are not outright
pugnacious at every turn because there are costs as well as benefits to any fight. These personal
costs induce agonists, through a gradual process of feedback and innovation, to adopt individual
rules of restraint for orderly engaging their competitors. Little, however, is understood about
how these general rules to curb quarrelsome impulses emerge at the level of the individual and
subsequently develop into full-blown social institutions modernly recognizable as forms of
property.
Calling property an “institution” is somewhat specious, for it evokes notions of
something being deliberately instituted by someone. And it is this notion regarding the origins of
property that has been the source of considerable philosophical debate since before the
Enlightenment. Whereas Hobbes (1651), Bentham (1802), and Sened (1997) would argue that
an exogenous state is the sole creator and guarantor of rights to property, others such as
Pufendorf (1672), Hume (1740), and Demsetz (1967) contend that property endogenously
evolves by graduated habit and custom, indeed the result of human action but not the grand
product of conscious design.
Ellickson (1989, 1991) attempts to disprove the former “legal-centralist” view of property
with a pointed example, the Anglo-American whaling industry in the mid 18th to mid 19th
centuries.1 During its heyday (and still today), whalers competed for prey in the open seas
beyond the reach of any state-instituted and -enforced rules of capture, and yet the community of
whalers established clear rules of capture.2 Not just any rule would do, however. Ellickson

1

Galanter (1981) credits J. Griffiths with coining the term “legal centralism” in a 1979 working paper to be
published and notes that “[t]he view that the justice to which we seek access is a product that is produced—or at
least distributed—exclusively by the state, a view which I shall for convenience label ‘legal centralism,’ is not an
uncommon one among legal professionals,” nor, we might add, among economists some 30 years later (p. 1).
2
Another example of the emergence of a system of property in the absence of a legal authority is the mining districts
of the California gold rush (Umbeck, 1977). Clay and Wright (2005) show that the content of the rules of property
during the gold rush critically depend upon how the non-renewable resource is distributed in concentrated areas.
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builds a case for the hypothesis that members of the whaling community developed norms that
were “wealth-maximizing,” i.e., whalers developed rules of conduct that minimized the sum of
the transaction and production costs of capturing their prey.

A primary implication of this

hypothesis is that different ecological conditions, in this case different types of prey, led to
different rules of capture. A further implication is that there also existed a set of counterfactual
norms that did not emerge. By examining the ecological sensitivity of the rules that whalers did
adopt and the nontrivial number of rules that they could have but did not develop, Ellickson
concludes that whaling norms were in fact “consistently sensitive to both production incentives
and transaction costs and varied in utilitarian fashion with the conditions prevailing in different
fisheries” (p. 95).
Our project focuses on two specific rules that emerged from hunting two different types
of whales (Ellickson 1989, 1991). British whalers in the 18th century hunted right whales, a type
of baleen whale, off the coast of Greenland and developed a rule that has been succinctly
summarized as fast-fish, loose-fish. If a right whale was held fast to a boat via harpoon or other
apparatus, the right to that whale belonged to that boat. If a whale was not attached to a boat or
escaped by ineptitude or chance, the loose fish was fair game for any boat.3 This rule worked
well because right whales are slow swimmers, not particularly feisty, and not prone to dive (and
take an attached boat down with it). On the other hand, sperm whales, the prey of American
whalers, swim faster, fight harder, and could drag an attached 19th century whaleboat under
water. Hence, the fast-fish, loose-fish rule was too costly to be employed to hunt sperm whales.
The rule that developed for this prey was called iron holds the whale. The primary difference
between the two rules is that with the latter rule, the harpoon did not have to be attached to the
boat. As long as the boat remained in pursuit of the harpooned or lanced whale, the whale
remained the property of the pursuer. If a boat failed to remain in reasonable proximity and/or
could not defend its intention of taking the whale, the next affixer could stake claim to it.
Faced with this historical contravening evidence, how might a (legal-centralist) skeptic
respond? By criticizing the empirical method of inquiry, for as Ellickson (1991) anticipates and
so politely characterizes it himself, “[a]ny ex post explanation risks being too pat” (p. 205).
Such repositioning of the argument is not unique to ex post explanations of questions in
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Or, as one of our subjects says, it’s “free game” when the prey escapes.

4
economic history and is simply an equivocation on the fundamental Duhem-Quine problem of
inquiry. When faced with specific empirical evidence on a question of science, is it the theory
that fails or is it the auxiliary assumptions in conducting the particular empirical analysis that we
reject? Either is an option, the choice of which is constrained only by our personal intellectual
commitments (Polanyi, 1958).
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to acutely probe, ex ante, the proposition that
property emerges anarchically out of social custom. Ellickson has only one realization of
whaling history on which to support his claim. To that we add 24 independent observations of
144 undergraduates from two universities who are some 85 years removed from 1924—the year
the last wooden whaleship left New Bedford harbor (it ingloriously sank).4 This paper, however,
is not just a test of Ellickson’s hypothesis of wealth-maximizing norms with participants who are
unfamiliar, if not completely ignorant, of 19th century whaler norms.

Ellickson’s seminal

contribution is highlighting the crucial role that specific ecological conditions play in the
emergence of property norms. Our experiment directly investigates this hypothesis by creating
two virtual ecological conditions of prey that differ in an arguably subtle way. Yet differences in
prey are not the only ecological factors that shape rules of capture. Any rule that emerges must
also operate in combination with the diverse dispositions and impulses of the whalers
themselves. Our experimental design allows us, like Ellickson, to assess which rules do not
emerge, but crucially, it also enables us to observe how anarchically unstable and hence
inefficient groups respond to different types of prey vis-à-vis stable, wealth-maximizing groups,
both of whom experience precisely the same change in ecological conditions. In other words, in
addition to observing how wealth-maximizing groups address changes in prey, we will also
observe the interaction of counter-sociable groups with directly comparable changes in ecology.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present our original between-group
experimental design, procedures, and hypotheses. Section III then reports the results from our
first two treatments. Based upon what we observed from the initial treatments, we introduce in
Section IV the design and results for a final within-group treatment. This treatment pins down

4

See Dolin (2007) for a fascinating history of American whaling from 1614-1924. The cast of characters includes
John Hancock, James Fennimore Cooper, and John Adams. Davis, Gallman, and Gleiter (1997) document a detailed
economic history of whaling for the period of 1816-1906.
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what we can learn from this experiment. The paper concludes with a discussion and closing
remarks in Section V.

II. Experiment Design, Procedures, and Hypotheses
II.A.

Preliminaries
While Ellickson’s observations on informal whaling rules serve as the inspiration for the

basic structure of our experimental design, we are under no illusion that we are capturing in toto
the conditions that naturally occurred over 150 years ago. (Our Internal Review Board vetoed
bringing any whales to campus for our subjects to hunt.)

The guiding principle behind the

choices of our numerous abstractions is parsimonious control, so our virtual whale hunts differ in
many ways, both intentionally and unintentionally, from those that occurred historically. Our
objective is to observe how differences in an exogenously imposed ecology affect the rules that
emerge for extracting a prey that lies open to any and every person in a randomly assigned
community. Given the large number of detailed parameters that are not expressly presented to
the subjects, we recommend reading the experiment instructions in Appendix A before reading
the rest of this section.

II.B.

Environment
Each subject is given control over a colored stick figure that identifies him or her by his

or her color name to the other subjects in the session (see Figure 1a). Each experimental session
consists of 26 periods of three minutes each. Each period is further subdivided into two 90second phases. In phase A, which is called the “Gathering” phase in the instructions, subjects
can move around an open “gathering” area shown in the middle portion of Figure 1a by left
clicking anywhere in the gathering area. Left clicking at anytime will immediately change their
direction and distance of travel taking the stick figure to that spot in the coordinate plane.5
Subjects have limited vision of the gathering area, as indicated by the gray 325-pixel diameter
that surrounds each stick figure.
Each session is comprised of six subjects. To allow the subjects time to familiarize
themselves with their task and forge a potential relationship, we use a “build” design similar to

5

Each pixel is one unit on a coordinate plane that comprises the gathering area.
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previous experiments that gradually increases the group size (Weber 2006; Crockett, Smith, and
Wilson 2009). Subjects begin the experiment in three paired groups; after period 13, all three
pairs merge into one group of six, which remains intact for the duration of the session.
During the first 60 seconds of phase A, the computer software randomly spawns white
circles for the subjects to gather. A total of four circles, or two per person, randomly appear in
the gathering area when the subjects are in pairs. After the subjects merge to a single group of
six in period 14, a total of ten circles appear so as to introduce some distributional tension into
the problem (two circles can no longer be evenly distributed to each person within a period). In
what we will call the Right treatment, circles move at a pace of 50 pixels/second; stick figures
only move at a speed of 25 pixels/second. The circles are always moving in a straight line to a
randomly chosen location unbeknownst to the subjects. After the circle reaches its destination, it
chooses another immediately and moves toward it. The circles also dive and surface.6 To get a
sense of the cumulative effect of these parameters, imagine that you control a stick figure that
you can move around an environment populated by other stick figures and also white circles that,
either travel in and out of your limited field of vision at a pace that is faster than you move, or
occasionally simply fade (dive) out of sight.
Each participant’s task is to earn money by “gathering” circles. We first discuss the
simplest case for gathering circles and then move on to more involved cases. Throughout the
experiment subjects can purchase “lines” in the previous period’s phase B. A subject can attach
a line to circle by right clicking on a circle within a 175-pixel diameter of their stick figure. A
colored line encircles each stick figure and denotes their “line-throwing” range. If the subject
misses the circle, (remember that the circles are constantly moving) the word “Miss” appears
where the line failed to attach to a circle. After a subject “attaches” a line to a circle, it takes 5
seconds to pull in the circle, during which time the circle no longer moves and the line continues
to connect the stick figure to the circle. After 5 seconds, the computer determines with a 75%
probability whether the circle will be successfully “pulled in” by the subject. If the subject is
successful, the circle appears in the designated cargo boxes that surround the gathering area. A
whole circle is worth 100 US cents and can be redeemed in Phase B of the experiment. Thus, in
6

More specifically, there are four status phases of circles: On-the-surface, Diving, Surfacing, and On-the-bottom. If
a circle is not On-the-bottom, then a line can be attached to it. A circle takes 5 seconds to dive or to surface and
continue to move and pick new destinations when On-the-bottom. Each second a circle is On-the-surface, there is a
10% chance it will dive. There is also a 25% chance each second a circle is On-the-bottom that it will surface.
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the first 39 minutes of the experiment a pair of subjects can earn a total of $52 between them. In
the last half of the experiment, there is $130 of prey roaming the gathering area.
If by a 25% chance a circle is not caught, then the stick figure and circle are free to move
around. At that instant there is an independent 25% chance that the circle will stop moving
altogether. Such a “dead” circle can be caught with a 100% probability by the next line or lines
that attach to it for the same value of a “live” moving circle.

After each successful or

unsuccessful throw, a stick figure must “cool down” for 5 seconds before it can throw another
line. If a circle survives an initial strike and does not die, any subsequent strike on this moving
circle will be successful with a 90% probability. After the first strike the circle also slows down
to roaming at 37.5 pixels/second, or 75% its original speed. If a circle survives a second and any
subsequent strikes, it permanently slows down to 25 pixels/second, the speed of the stick figures.
Finally, circles die at a rate of 50% the instant after all second and subsequent strikes are
unsuccessful.
The more involved cases arise when one subject is attached to a circle and additional
subjects also right click and attach a line to the same circle. The result of this process is that any
or all of n attached subjects can successfully catch a circle. As mentioned above, when only one
subject catches a circle only that subject can redeem it for 100 cents. However, when m ≤ n
subjects successfully catch a circle (each person has its own independent probability of being
successful), each successful subject only receives a pie-sized piece of the circle worth 1/m2 of the
total value of the circle. The remaining amount of the circle, (m – 1)/m, is lost as waste from the
fight for the circle. For example, if two subjects successfully catch the same circle, each receives
a quarter of a circle worth 25 cents, and 50 cents is lost to the ether. If three subjects catch a
circle, each receives 11 cents and 67 cents is lost. The fractions lost are displayed in the box in
the bottom right portion of Figure 1a under the heading, “Portions Lost.” The salient monetary
losses are important to keep in mind when evaluating the observed amount of double, triple,
quadruple, and even occasionally quintuple strikes that are made on attached circles in Section
III.7

7

A reader asks, “Is there any evidence of this particular loss function (I find it hard to believe that on average the
introduction of a second whaler reduces output by a half)?” As we state in opening this section, some of our design
choices do not have direct historical parallels to whaling in the 17th and 18th centuries, and the particular form of the
loss function is one of those choices. The pertinent question is not about historical parallels of the loss function, but
how well does it serve its purpose in the experiment? Our goal is to make conflict costly so as to provide a salient
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In phase B, which is called the “Interim” phase in the instructions, subjects can redeem
caught circles and any portions thereof for money by right clicking and dragging the circle to the
“Buyer” on the right side of the screen (see Figure 1b). They can also transfer circles or money
to any other subject, and they can use the chat room in the center of screen to communicate with
each other. To transfer money, subjects click on the ¢-tab in the cargo box, left click the amount
to add to the total to send, and the drag the amount indicated to another subject’s cargo area. All
transfers of circles and money are publicly recorded in the chat room. Finally, during the Interim
phase subjects can purchase new lines for use in later periods. All transfers of circles and whales
are publicly recorded in the chat room.
There are two types of lines, regular and colored, which cost 10 and 20 cents,
respectively.

The lines have exactly the same capabilities in catching a circle, the only

difference, apart from the cost, is that a colored line will change the color of the circle to the
color of the thrower, regardless whether the line is successful or not. If another stick figure
attempts to attach a colored line to a colored circle, then both colors are displayed in equal
proportion on the circle. So, for example, if Red throws a colored line at a white circle and with
a 25% chance it gets away, one red circle will roam the gathering area among the other white
circles. If Blue subsequently attaches to the red-colored whale with a colored line, half of the
circle will become blue and half remains red. If while Blue is attached to the half-red, half-blue
circle, Green comes along and attaches a colored line to the same circle, it becomes one-third
red, one-third blue, and one-third green, and so forth. Regular lines have no coloring effect on
white or colored circles. We will discuss the reasoning behind this aspect of the design in the
hypothesis subsection below.
Importantly, subjects are only told that circles must be redeemed in order to accumulate
earnings to be paid in cash at the end of the experiment; otherwise they are not told why
transferring, chatting, or using one type of line or another might be advantageous. The reader
will also note that the minutiae of the circle movements and probabilities are not explained to the
subjects in the instructions. These are aspects of this novel environment that they must learn

motivation for solving the problem. By design, failing to form a social order comes at a nontrivial monetary cost.
This is decidedly important for when we observe rampant waste from conflict in some economies and very little in
others, lest someone raise the question of insufficient monetary motivation for solving the social problem. Our loss
function does appear to have succeeded in grabbing the attention of our subjects. The transcripts are filled with
comments like “we wont get any money if it splits” and “its really not worth it otherwise [to split the circles]”.
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from trial-and-error. We note that while the plethora of written details may leave the reader with
the impression that this is a difficult task for a subject to comprehend, the challenging part of this
“video game”, as our subjects have called it, is not with navigating the software interface with
left and right mouse clicks, but with solving the problem of forming a social order with the other
participants.8 After the first three periods, rare is the circle that is not captured by at least one
person. A three-minute video demonstration of the software is available for viewing at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=26eHNShfMGI.9
While our experiment does involve a resource that lays free to anyone that would capture
it in an open area, this superficial similarity to fishing does not mean, as readers have
erroneously asserted, that this is an experiment on the common pool resource problem. The
central problem of a common pool resource is overuse, i.e., a problem associated with how much
of a resource is extracted from a common pool. By design our resource fully replenishes each
period because we are interested in how people go about extracting a resource, i.e., we are
investigating the more limited but fundamental question of what system of rules, if any, emerges
to delineate what is yours from what is mine while extracting a constantly renewing resource.10

II.C.

Treatments and Hypotheses
As mentioned above, our objective is to exogenously vary the ecological conditions of

the prey to observe how this affects which rules, if any, predominantly emerge to minimize
losses from the whalers’ conflicting interests.

The parameters described in the previous

subsection refer to what we will call the Right (whale) treatment. In the second treatment, which
we call the Sperm treatment, the prey is more difficult to catch. Our sperm whales move 50%

8

One subject from the Sony PlayStation generation offers this implied comment on the complexity of their task: “i
guess the money isn’t bad considering were just playing a lame video game”.
9
Please note that in the actual sessions six subjects do not appear together until period 14.
10
Ellickson (1991, pp. 205-6) specifically rejoins the critic who “assert[s] that the whalers’ norms were too shortsighted to be welfare maximizing” when pointing out that whalers over-fished the seas. First, it would require a
“sophisticated scientific understanding of whale breeding and also an international system for monitoring worldwide
catches…Whalers who recognized the risk of overfishing thus could rationally ignore that risk when making norms
on the ground that the norm-makers could make no cost-justified contribution to its solution.” Second, “[e]ven
though overwhaling may not have been welfare maximizing from a global perspective, the rapid depletion of
whaling stocks may well have been in the interest of the club of whalers centered in southern New England. From
their parochial perspective, grabbing as many of the world’s whales as quickly as possible was a plausibly welfaremaximizing strategy…[due to] entry into whaling by mariners in…other ports that could prove to be beyond their
control”.
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faster than right whales, or three times the speed of the whalers.11 Once first harpooned, a sperm
whale is successfully pulled in only 25% of the time, which is one-third the probability of a right
whale being pulled in, and sperm whales only die with 10% probability after the first strike. In
both treatments, each whole whale is worth 100 cents; the same number of whales appear in the
gathering area each comparable period; and all harpoons cost and function the same. Table 1
summarizes the parameters for both treatments.
We designed the two types of harpoons described to allow our subjects to more clearly
express the two different rules of capture that Ellickson studied in whalers over 150-250 years
ago: fast-fish, loose-fish and iron holds the whale. If our subjects adopt a fast-fish, loose-fish
rule (we think it’s safe to say that 99% were unaware that their computerized task crudely
models Anglo-American whaling), there is no need to pay twice as much for colored harpoons; a
colored line simply leaves money on the table. In contrast, a subject who adopts the iron holds
the whale rule may believe that there is at least a value of 10 cents to marking a whale as his,
which is 10% of the redemption value of a whole whale and 40% of the redemption value of a
whale split two ways. A bright, fully colored circle provides stark evidence to back up any claim
that a particular whaler affixed the first harpoon. This rule rewards the investment of the first
harpoon that subsequently slows a whale down and makes it more likely that subsequent
harpoons will successfully pull in the whale. Recall from Table 1 that the first harpoon in a
sperm whale is only successful 25% of the time, whereas any subsequent harpoon is 75%
successful. While regular lines also equally reduce the speed and increase the probability of
taking a whale with a future strike, there is no evidence of who took the risk (bore the cost) of
affixing the first harpoon. We chose to conclude the second half of a session with a group of six
subjects to make it difficult for the subjects to keep track of who threw which regular harpoons
into which whale.
Of course, it is possible that our subjects do not adopt either of these rules, nor for that
matter any rule of capture. A free-for-all is feasible, and not at all unanticipated given the
11

Henceforth we shall often refer to circles as “whales,” subjects as “whalers,” etc. We proceed in this manner
purely for convenience and not because we have forgotten our remarks at the beginning of section II.A. Though one
subject refers to the circles as “whales” in the chat room, the majority of subjects simply refer to them as “circles;”
others call them “balls,” “bubbles,” “eggs,” or “fish.” Subjects also refer to the task confronting them in several
ways, variously likening it to fishing, butterfly catching, and participating in an Easter egg hunt. This demonstrates
that even though experimenters may implement what they consider to be neutral instructions, subjects provide their
own context based upon their personal life experiences.
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rampant disorder that Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) report in their virtual communities.
We can determine whether any rules of capture are present by the number of harpoons affixed to
a whale that is attached to a whaler. After an initial harpoon strike, every subsequent strike on an
attached whale risks wasting 100(m – 1)/m cents.12 Thus, subsequent strikes can “take” 100 –
100/m2 cents from a successful first harpooner. We fully expect this costly behavior. The
question is whether we will observe a spontaneous order emerge out of the initially unruly and
thus inefficient environment. Based upon the random assignment of subjects to treatments, our
aim is identify and characterize any spontaneous orders. At this point, it is not clear whether the
delicate differences between the Sperm and Right treatments in Table 1 will lead to similar social
orders, different social orders, or no social order at all.
However, we do have an ex ante hypothesis that ecology matters, i.e., that we will
observe a different social orders in the two different treatments. Specifically, we predict that we
will observe more fast-fish, loose-fish behavior in the Right treatment than in the Sperm
treatment, and complementarily, more iron holds the whale behavior in the Sperm treatment than
in the Right treatment. Within the Right treatment, we also predict more fast-fish, loose-fish
behavior than iron holds the whale behavior, and vice versa, more iron holds the whale behavior
than fast-fish, loose-fish behavior in the Sperm treatment. Finally, we do not expect widespread
use of a third rule that is feasible in our experiment, namely, split ownership, a rule whereby
everyone gets an equal share of the total earnings from a whale hunt. This potential rule of
capture is why our design allows subjects to transfer whole whales or cash to other subjects
during the Interim phase. However, we anticipate that this rule will be too costly for subjects to
widely adopt. To reiterate:
Ex Ante Hypothesis 1a: Ecology matters for forming a social order.
Ex Ante Hypothesis 1b: Fast-fish, loose-fish will be more prevalent in the Right sessions than in
the Sperm sessions, and iron holds the whale will be more prevalent in the Sperm sessions than
in the Right sessions.
Ex Ante Hypothesis 1c: In the Right sessions, there will be more fast-fish, loose-fish than iron
holds the whale. In the Sperm sessions, there will be more iron holds the whale than fast-fish,
loose-fish.

12

Such waste is not guaranteed since there is a 10% (25%) chance that the subsequent strikers will be unsuccessful
in pulling in a share of the whale for themselves in the Right (Sperm) treatment.
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Ex Ante Hypothesis 2: Split ownership will not be widely employed in either treatment.
II.D.

Procedures
We conducted six replicates of each of the Right and Sperm treatments. These 72

subjects were recruited from the general student body of a large state university. We discuss a
third treatment in Section IV for which we recruited another 72 subjects at a midsize private
university. (In Section IV we also report that the change in subject pools has no statistical effect
for the first 13 periods in which the parameters of the third treatment very nearly match those in
the Right treatment.) No subject participated twice, and all subjects were randomly recruited via
an electronic email system and paid $7 for showing up on time. When subjects arrived in the
laboratory they were seated at visually isolated computer terminals where they privately read
through self-paced instructions. Subjects were free to ask questions during the instructions and
throughout the experiment. Not including the show-up payment, mean earnings for all 144
subjects were $27.59 and paid privately at the conclusion of the session which lasted less than
the two hours for which they were recruited.

III. Results from the Right and Sperm Treatments
Each harpoon thrown suggests which rules might be guiding the actions of the player
who threw the harpoon. While no social scientist can peer into the minds of his or her subjects to
ascertain whether a given rule governs their behavior, or even to determine whether their actions
simply do not contradict the rule, we can use trends in the observed proportion of harpoon
throws that appear to follow a specific rule as tethered evidence that the rule is used relatively
more than other potential rules. Specifically, we classify each harpoon thrown into one of four
categories according to the rule that it suggests: fast-fish, loose-fish; iron holds the whale;
deadweight loss; and unknowable. The categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. In the
following explanation of these categories, we use feminine pronouns in reference to the first
person to strike a whale and masculine pronouns for subsequent strikers.
First, while anyone is attached to a whale, regardless of the type of line she is using, a
subsequent strike on the whale clearly does not demonstrate wealth maximization, as this
behavior may waste portions of the whale depending upon the random probability that both
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parties are successful in pulling it in. Thus, any of these interloping harpoons are counted as
deadweight loss.
If a subject finds an uncolored whale and strikes it with a colored line, we classify it as
iron holds the whale. This harpoon suggests that she is attempting to convey to the other whalers
that she struck the whale. If she is behaving according to fast-fish, loose-fish, then she could
have used the cheaper, but equally effective regular lines since she would have no incentive to
mark the whale under fast-fish, loose-fish.
Suppose that a first striker who used a colored line, and any interlopers, are all
unsuccessful in capturing a whale. Now there is a free-roaming colored whale. If the first striker
harpoons it again, then this suggests that she is behaving according to iron holds the whale. In
this case, the type of line used does not matter because she already marked the whale with her
initial strike. On the other hand, if someone else finds this colored whale before the first striker
does and harpoons it with a regular line, then it is unclear which norm he is following unless the
circle is captured by him. If the second striker respects the property right claimed by the first
striker when she colored the whale, he will transfer the whale or some amount of money to her,
perhaps keeping a “finders” fee for himself. This harpoon is then coded as iron holds the whale.
If he does not transfer anything to the first striker, then the harpoon is classified as fast-fish,
loose-fish. If he is unsuccessful in pulling in the whale, then we cannot predict what his
intentions were and must categorize the strike as unknowable.
If a second striker of a colored whale uses a colored line on the already colored freeroaming whale, then this does not immediately suggest either fast-fish, loose-fish or iron holds
the whale. The second striker should not use a colored line if he is following fast-fish, loose-fish
because a regular line is an equally effective but less expensive alternative. Thus, the strike is
classified as unknowable if he captures it with a colored line and does not transfer wealth to the
first striker.13 Likewise, the second striker should not use a colored line if he is following iron
holds the whale because it is now unclear who the original claimant is in the event that he is
unsuccessful and a third player then finds and successfully captures this multicolored whale.
However, if the second striker captures the whale and transfers money or the whale to the first-

13

Of the 3,091 harpoons thrown in the Right and Sperm treatments, only 21 in each treatment are classified as
unknowable and hence we do not consider this category in any of our analysis.
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striker, then that strike is classified as iron holds the whale because the transfer of wealth
indicates that he acknowledges the first striker’s property right.
In comparing across treatments, we normalize the number of harpoons in the Sperm
treatment based upon the expected number of harpoons it takes to successfully pull in a whale.14
Table 1 reports that the expected number of harpoons per whale in the Right and Sperm
treatments, is approximately 1.2697 and 1.9577, respectively. Thus, for the purposes of directly
comparing the two treatments, we scale down the number of Sperm harpoons by dividing the
totals by the ratio

1.9577
1.2697

= 1.549. Likewise, for all data presented for periods 1-13, unless noted to

the contrary, we scale the total number of harpoons by the relative number of whales available;
specifically, we divide pair data by

12
10

. We focus our analysis on data from the last 6 periods of

the session, which is (approximately) the last half of the session for which the subjects were in
one group of six.15
Before we present our quantitative findings, we first discuss a qualitative organization of
the data. Figures 2 and 3 report the scaled number of harpoons thrown in the Right and Sperm
treatments, respectively. The vertical line separates the pair data from the sextuplet data within a
session. This change clearly and permanently increases the number of deadweight loss harpoons
in the Sperm treatment and in three of the six Right sessions. In the three other Right sessions (2,
3, and 4), the number of deadweight loss harpoons spikes in periods 14-16, but then drops off
substantially for the final quarter of the session. Of those, some are reported in the Interim phase
to be accidents, for which they explicitly apologize, lest they be misunderstood as blatantly
violating their customary rules of capture.16
Figure 4 summarizes the data from all 12 sessions for periods 21-26. The height of the
bar is the total number of deadweight loss harpoons in the session.17 The colors of the bar
represent the relative proportion of non-deadweight loss harpoons that are classified as fast-fish,
loose-fish and iron holds the whale. First, note that there are only three sessions with a rather
14

After the first three periods, rare is the whale in either treatment which is not captured by at least one person.
There are no tests for which we find a significant result using the same test on all data for periods 14-26, but
which is insignificant using the subsample of periods 21-26.
16
As Purple in Right4 explains, “sometimes its a mistake that we nab eachothers…..we see( ’e)m at the same time
and we(’)re like the seagulls from finding nemo, MINE!”
17
Total profits by session inversely rank order the sessions with respect to the number of deadweight loss harpoons.
In terms of profits, the difference between Right2, -3, and -4 and Right1, -5, and -6 is as stark as it is for the number
of deadweight loss harpoons. Likewise, profits in the Sperm sessions fall in between this gap.
15
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low number of deadweight loss harpoons. These sessions, all from the Right treatment, average
1.8 deadweight loss harpoons per period. The remaining three Right sessions average 8.0
deadweight loss harpoons per period. In other words, a Right session either clearly establishes
customary rules of capture or it is a chaotic free-for-all; there are none in between. Lying
between this gulf is the scaled number of deadweight loss harpoons in the Sperm treatment, the
average of which is 4.3 harpoons per period. The Sperm sessions do not establish wealthmaximizing norms like the best sessions in the Right treatment do (though Sperm6 comes close).
But they also do not double hit attached whales as frequently as the worst Right sessions do,
perhaps because sperm whales move 50% faster than right whales.
The second summary observation of note is the predominance of fast-fish, loose-fish in
both treatments.18 In the Right treatment, two of the three more efficient sessions and two of the
three less efficient sessions chiefly throw fast-fish, loose-fish harpoons. On the other hand, all
six Sperm sessions throw more fast-fish, loose-fish harpoons than iron holds the whale harpoons,
though the proportion is close in Sperm6, 51% to 49%. So when a session does not clearly
establish wealth-maximizing rules of capture, the whalers respond quite economically by buying
the cheaper regular harpoons. This, however, leaves us with a total of three sessions that conform
to our predictions, split 2 to 1 between the two rules, and thus the need for the new hypotheses
and concomitant treatment in Section IV. This brings us to our first formal finding.

Finding 1a: Ecology indeed matters in forming a wealth-maximizing social order.
Evidence: Figure 4. No Sperm session achieves an efficient social order of Right2,-3, and -4, as
measured by the number of deadweight loss harpoons. However, in no Sperm session does
anarchy so utterly break down into “amorphy”, as Hirshleifer (1995) calls it, as it so clearly does
in Right1,-5, and -6. Individual temperaments within a group also appear to matter eminently in
the Right treatment, but not in the Sperm treatment.
Finding 1b: There is no statistical difference in the scaled number of fast-fish, loose-fish
harpoons thrown in the Right and Sperm treatments. There is also no statistical difference in the
usage of iron holds the whale harpoons across treatments.
18

Pooling the Right and Sperm treatments, we reject null hypothesis of equal fast-fish, loose-fish and iron holds the
whale harpoons using a Wilcoxon signed rank test (W12 = 68, p-value = 0.0210, two-sided).
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Evidence: Using a Wilcoxon rank sum test comparing each independent session, we fail to reject
the null hypothesis of equal number of fast-fish, loose-fish harpoons (U6,6 = 19, p-value = 0.5319,
one-sided test). As the p-value greater than 0.5 indicates, contrary to our Ex Ante Hypothesis, the
mean number of fast-fish, loose-fish harpoons is higher in the Sperm treatment than in the Right
treatment. Out of an average of 97.5 harpoons thrown in the Right treatment in periods 21-26,
44.3 are consistent with fast-fish, loose-fish. In contrast, in the Sperm treatment 52.0 of an
average of 87.1 harpoons thrown in periods 21-26 are fast-fish, loose-fish compatible. Likewise,
we fail to reject the null hypothesis of an equal number of iron holds the whale harpoons (U6,6 =
23.5, p-value = 0.8030, one-sided test). Whereas the average Sperm session uses only 9.5 iron
holds the whale harpoons over periods 21-26, the average Right session uses 23.8. The means
are again in the opposite direction of our Ex Ante Hypothesis.
Finding 1c: For the Sperm treatment, contra our Ex Ante Hypothesis every single session uses
more fast-fish, loose-fish harpoons than iron holds the whale harpoons. Within the Right
treatment, whalers use as many iron holds the whale harpoons as they do fast-fish, loose-fish
harpoons.
Evidence: Using a Wilcoxon signed rank test comparing the paired number of fast-fish, loosefish and iron holds the whale harpoons in each session, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of an
equal number of harpoons of each type against the alternative of more iron holds the whale in the
Sperm treatment (W6 = 0, p-value = 1.000, one-sided test). The average Sperm session uses 42.5
more fast-fish, loose-fish than iron holds the whale harpoons, ranging from a low of 1.3 more to
a high of 68.8 more. In the Right treatment, there is no statistical difference (W6 = 16, p-value =
0.1562, one-sided). One Right session uses 49 more iron holds the whale than fast-fish, loosefish harpoons and another uses 68 more fast-fish, loose-fish than iron holds the whale harpoons.
Before taking stock of what we’ve learned thus far, we assess in our second finding the
degree to which split ownership rule is utilized.
Finding 2: Very little cash and very few whales are redistributed among the whalers in the
Interim period.
Evidence: To examine the split ownership rule, we count the total value of the whales (wt) and
cash (ct) transferred in period t. Table 2 reports the total amounts transferred in periods 14-26 by
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session. Very little is transferred. Using a Wilcoxon rank sum test, we fail to reject the null
hypothesis of equal amounts transferred in the Right and Sperm treatments (U6,6 = 26, p-value =
0.2403, two-sided test). While one Sperm session engages in considerable redistribution during
the Interim phase, none of the three wealth-maximizing Right sessions (2, 3, and 4) transfer a
single penny of earnings amongst each other. It is not difficult to conclude that the split
ownership norm is not our subjects’ solution to their environment and the hunting task they
confront.19
A skeptic’s conclusion from Findings 1 and 2 might be to hastily dismiss these treatments
as failures, so it is worth spending a few sentences reflecting on what we do find with these first
two treatments. An advantage of a laboratory experiment vis-à-vis the naturally occurring world
is its scale. We can learn from what we fail to observe in a way that is not possible outside the
laboratory because we can create a further treatment to explore the clues in Figure 4 that hint at

19

Because people can transfer money to each other, our experiment allows for positive rewards for good behavior.
Negative sanctions are also possible by deliberately following a deviant around in order to harpoon the deviant’s
harpooned whales. The subjects in Right2 talk explicitly about this in period 15 and agree to target Green for his
unruly behavior:
Red: green you took mine! haha
Orange: what ever happen to our deal??
Green: hhahah im the best
Green: im the master
Teal: i know right
Blue: green u suck\
Green: i leraned the best from teal
Orange: ok everybody only steal from green
Teal: LOL
Blue: k
Red: haha
Green: hahah hey no fair
Orange: deal
Teal: deal
Purple: haha
Orange: blue??
Orange: dude come on
Blue: sorry..
Purple: hahahaha
Orange: or dudet u in??
Orange: steal from green no one else
Orange: ??
Blue: i will
Purple: me 2
Orange: sweet
Eventually Green reforms. As Figure 2 shows, Right2 whalers threw many deadweight loss harpoons shortly after
the sextuplet forms, but the number of double hits falls precipitously until the end of the session. We thank Robert
Ellickson for his questions about the possibilities for negative informal sanctions.
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the emergence of social orders. And what are these clues? With slower, easier to capture prey, a
community of six is either wealth-maximizing or it is not. Moreover, groups hunting faster,
harder to capture prey split this difference. This is a nontrivial systematic result considering how
subtle the changes are between the Right and Sperm treatments. So while the medians do not
statistically differ in terms of the number of deadweight loss harpoons thrown (U6,6 = 18, p-value
= 1.000, two-sided test), we see potential; there are the outlines of social orders leading us to
probe further and test our conjectured learning.
Finally, the chat room transcripts provide evidence that is consistent with such orders. In
each transcript from Right2, -3, and -4 someone is observed to make an explicit appeal to a fastfish, loose-fish rule. 20 Immediately after the first period hunting as a sextuplet, Orange in Right2
proposes a fast-fish agreement:
Orange: lets agree to not hit once someone is on it alot of money is lost
Green: hahah
Blue: true
Orange: my partner and i did and it worked well
Purple: yup
Orange: agreed??
Blue: agreed
Orange: green??
Orange: teal??
Blue: lol
Purple: haha
Blue: guess not
Teal: yea that sounds like a plan

The subjects in Right3 also have a conversation in period 15 with explicit fast-fish and loose-fish
provisions:
Orange: if you steal another person's hit we all lose 50
Blue: the pies getting smaller nam saying
Blue: lets spread out and not steal then cuz
Orange: so if somebody gets one it would be more advantageous to let them have it
Blue: yeah
Red: sounds good
Orange: and then it can be free game if they dsont catch it

There is similar case in period 14 of Right4 and everyone joins the conversation:
Purple: we missed a bunch
Green: i think its first tagged first served

20

More so than the average person, economists are chary if not openly hostile to accepting at face value what people
say, for as McCloskey (2010) notes, “[s]ometimes people mean what they say, or at least say by accident their
meaning. Words are data for a social science, too” (p. 43). The burden rests with the skeptic for offering a theory
and evidence that the participants in the three sessions that have successfully formed a working social order do not
in fact mean what they say when they agree to abide by a rule recognizable as fast-fish, loose-fish.
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Orange: yeah
Red: agreed!
Green: anything else is a hyge waste
Green: huge*
Blue: that would be better
Orange: we wont get any money if it splits
Orange: okay
Orange: first tag first serve!
Orange: good idea
Green: so everyone play nice? no pirates?
Purple: boo
Red: anyone know the purpose of the color?
Purple: yeah
Blue: what is it?
Orange: its pointless
Teal: yhoutght so
Green: anyone not for that?
Red: just more expensive
Teal: so first grab first get
Purple: sounds good
Orange: yup
Red: great
Teal: no fighting!
Orange: its really not worth it otherwise

Figure 5 is a snapshot of the fast-fish, loose-fish rule at work late in the Right4 session. This
particular whale escaped from Purple and now Blue is attached to it. Even though it is within
Purple’s range, her cool down time has expired, and she has yet to catch a whale this period, she
acknowledges Blue’s right to it, as does Red. Also notice that all of the six previously caught
whales are whole and white.
To summarize, we have found that ecology does matter in whether a social order forms
but we have too little data from successful economies (3 out of 12) to conclude anything about
the content of the rules that govern the social order. For that we design a new treatment.

IV. Sort: A Within- and Between-Group Design
IV.A. Design and Hypothesis
At this juncture our project exemplifies what Latour (1999) pithily contends is
subsidiarily true of all scientific hypothesizing, namely that “[s]cientists’ predictions or
previsions are always postdictions or repetitions” (p. 272). We now present a hypothesis that is
unrepentantly grounded in postdictions of the Sperm and Right treatments. A rereading of
Ellickson (1991) in light of our results reveals an understated but potentially important design
consideration (emphasis added):
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•

“[A]ccording to the hypothesis, whalers switched to iron holds the whale because that
rule’s advantages in reducing deadweight losses outweighed its transaction-cost
disadvantages” (p. 201).

•

“[W]halers succeeded in [settling disputes without any guidance from American courts]
during a time period in which all British decisions on whale ownership supported norms
other than the iron-holds-the-whale rule [chiefly, fast-fish, loose-fish] that the
Americans were increasingly adopting” (p. 204).

•

“The critic might challenge the offered utilitarian interpretation on a number of grounds.
First, the evidence suggests that whalers might have been wise to use the first-iron rule
for sperm whales and the fast-fish rule for right whales. They did not, and instead varied
their rules according to the location of the fishery, not according to species” (p. 205).

The first two quotations highlight that history matters. Among American whalers, iron holds the
whale emerged spontaneously on the heel of another established rule, principally fast-fish, loosefish. Moreover, this was a gradual process of change in response to increases in deadweight loss
when the old rule no longer fit the ecology of the prey within a particular geographic community,
as the third quotation specifies.
Our new treatment incorporates these observations. Our first aim for the new treatment is
a feature that regularly predicts for our sextuplet communities the stable adoption of a wealthmaximizing rule of capture, whether fast-fish, loose-fish or iron holds the whale or neither. The
second aim is to change our between-group comparison to a within-group comparison, i.e.,
change the type of whale from right to sperm within a session to reflect the historical chronology
of the emergent norms. The former feature provides the important empirical foundation for
investigating the latter feature of how established wealth-maximizing rules evolve to fit the
ecological circumstances.
An implicit assumption of Ellickson’s hypothesis is that whale boat captains were part of
a process of trial and error that selected for “whalers” who respected a community’s rules of
capture, whatever the rules may be or however they evolved. While 19th century whaling was
not without its conflicts, disputes were not rampant. Ellickson writes that “[t]he international
whaling community was a tight one… primarily because whaling ships commonly encountered
one another at sea, and because whalers’ home and layover ports were few, intimate, and socially
interlinked.

The scant evidence available suggests that whalers’ norms of capture were

internationally binding” (1991, p. 193).
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Within the framework of our original design, we looked for an observable metric from
the first 13 periods that would with which we could prevision (and replicate from past
experience) a community-minded sextuplet for periods 14-26. In the Right and Sperm treatments
we recruit six random people for a session and force them to interact in a community in which no
one can be excluded, nor can anyone exclude themselves no matter their individual dispositions.
For our last treatment, which we will call Sort, we invite 12 participants each for six sessions and
then divide them into two groups of six after period 13: Civil and Rude.21 Unbeknownst to the
subjects, the Civil (Rude) group is comprised of the top (bottom) three pairs from periods 8-13
that have the fewest (highest) total number of strikes on attached whales. The idea is that this
early behavior predicts whether or not the sextuplet will develop and abide by a rule of capture.22
In a civil community, no single person sets himself above the others by striking an attached
whale; there is a mutual, or better, reciprocal, respect for evolved rules of capture. In contrast,
rude members of a group put their own material interests above the interests of others by striking
attached whales.
For the second aim of this final treatment, we add an additional 13 periods to the end of
the session. For the first 26 periods, right whales are the prey, but for the last 13 periods the prey
switches without announcement to sperm whales in both the Civil and Rude groups. Because we
have increased the number of periods by 50%, we decrease the value of a whale and the cost of
harpoons by 40%. Table 3 compares the parameters of Sort treatment with the Right treatment.
The only other difference is that we trim the Interim phase from 90 seconds to 60 seconds so that
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We are using civil and rude in the common 18th century meaning of the words. Our modern lexicon does not have
a better pair of mutual antonyms for our purposes. As opposed to the modern meaning connoting a citizen of a state,
civil in the 18th century also meant “relating to a community of men, or to a man as a member of community”
(Johnson 1755). Rude also conveyed a much harsher sense then than it does now, connoting “rough, savage, coarse
of manners, uncivil, brutal” (Johnson 1755). Adam Ferguson in his An Essay on the History of Civil Society
distinguishes rude societies from civil ones based upon the establishment of property. He describes people “[o]f rude
nations, under the impressions of Property and Interest”, as a “band of robbers, who prey without restraint, or
remorse, on their neighbors” (1767, pp. 82-83). That aptly describes the whalers of Right1, -5, and -6. We could
have used communital instead of civil, but the latter additionally conveys, just as rude does, how the community
goes about their business in way that the former does not.
22
Following Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and McCabe (2007) and Rigdon, McCabe, and Smith (2007), we do not
reveal to our subjects how their group is formed because our hypothesis is not about the rules of capture that people
develop when they know they are combined with two other pairs who have the fewest or highest total number of
strikes on attached whales in the previous six periods. Rather, the question is what rules, if any, spontaneous emerge
amongst six similarly disposed people who happen to find themselves suddenly interacting with four other likeminded people.

22
we can continue to complete the sessions within two hours. In the first two treatments, the
Interim phase appeared to have about half a minute’s worth a slack.
In general terms we hypothesize that Civil sextuplets will respond to the ecological
change in whale type in a wealth-maximizing manner and that Rude sextuplets will not respond
to the change or will respond in a way that is not wealth-maximizing. More specifically, the Sort
treatment generates eight hypotheses, the findings for which we examine in detail in the next
subsection:
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•

Baseline Hypothesis: For periods 1-13, there is no difference in the number of fast-fish,
loose-fish, iron holds the whale, and deadweight loss harpoons in the Sort (in aggregate)
and Right treatments.

•

Civil Pair Hypothesis: For periods 8-13, Civil pairs throw fewer deadweight loss
harpoons than Right pairs. 23

•

Civil Sextuplet Hypothesis: For periods 21-26, Civil sextuplets throw fewer deadweight
loss harpoons than Right and Rude sextuplets.

•

Civil Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish Hypothesis: For periods 21-26, Civil sextuplets throw more
fast-fish, loose-fish than iron holds the whale harpoons.

•

Ellickson Hypothesis: For Civil sextuplets, there is a structural break in the number of
deadweight loss harpoons thrown when the prey changes from right to sperm whales in
period 27.

•

Ellickson Counterhypothesis: For Rude sextuplets, there is no structural break in the
number of deadweight loss harpoons thrown when the prey changes from right to sperm
whales in period 27.

•

Auxiliary Ellickson Hypothesis: The usage of iron holds the whale harpoons is
nondecreasing in Civil sextuplets.

•

Auxiliary Ellickson Counterhypothesis: The usage of iron holds the whale harpoons
decreases in Rude sextuplets.

Except where noted, there are no tests for which we find a significant result using the same test on all data for
periods 1-13 or 14-26, but which is insignificant using the subsample of periods 8-13 or 21-26.
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IV.B. Results
Given that we have changed a couple minor parameters and the subject pool with the new
Sort treatment, our first finding is important to establish that we have the same baseline in
periods 1-13.
Finding 3 (Baseline Hypothesis): There is no difference in the number of fast-fish, loose-fish,
iron holds the whale, and deadweight loss harpoons in the Sort and Right treatments summed
over periods 1-13.24
Evidence: Using a Wilcoxon rank sum test on the 36 independent pairs in the Sort treatment and
the 18 independent pairs in the Right treatment, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal
number of harpoons in each of the three categories with two-sided tests (fast-fish, loose-fish:
U36,18 = 393.5, p-value = 0.2047; iron holds the whale: U36,18 = 367, p-value = 0.4387;25 and
deadweight loss: U36,18 = 334.5, p-value = 0.8495).
Having established that we have the same baseline in Sort and Right for the first 13
periods, we check that our metric separates out civil-minded pairs in Sort relative to Right where
both civil and rude subjects are “lumped” together.

24

To illustrate that the participants are in fact exploring different rules early in the session and weighing the costs
and benefits of the colored lines, the following is a conversation of one pair in periods 3 and 4 of Sort5:
Orchid: use the colored ones... then we know who's is whos
Orchid: white are up for grabs
Olive: hm
Olive: We can see who is hitting whose just by the lines
Olive: don't need the colored
Orchid: can we agree that if it's my color you wont go for it? that justifies the higher cost for the colored line
Orchid: we're not always next to eachother
Civil4 has a similar conversation in period 19:
Green:ok so when its not ur color dont grab itt
Brown: haha
Brown: and if you see the word 'hit dont go after it"
Green: yeah
Brown: you guys are balla..using colored lines
(For those readers unfamiliar with urban vernacular, “balla” is a suburban variant of “baller”, which means a person
ostentatiously displaying wealth and a cocky attitude.)
We also conducted a rigorous content analysis on the chat transcripts involving 200 hours of work by seven
research assistants. Appendix B discusses the procedures and results. Of the 21 different codes that the research
assistants could assign to each line of chat, there was only one significant treatment difference: Civil sextuplets
discuss the change in circle movements more than the Rude sextuplets. One out of 21 is too close to α = .05 to draw
any conclusions.
25
In the sole exception to footnote 12, for periods 8-13 we can reject the null hypothesis in favor the alternative that
there are more iron holds the whale harpoons in the Right treatment than in the Sort treatment (U36,18 = 424.5, pvalue = 0.0648).
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Finding 4 (Civil Pair Hypothesis): Civil pairs throw fewer deadweight loss harpoons than Right
pairs for periods 8-13.
Evidence: Using a Wilcoxon rank sum test on the 18 independent Civil pairs and the 18
independent Right pairs, we reject the null hypothesis of equal number of deadweight loss
harpoons in favor of the alternative of fewer deadweight loss harpoons in Civil (U18,18 = 240, pvalue = 0.0066, one-sided test). On average a Civil pair throws 1.1 deadweight loss harpoons as
opposed to 3.8 such harpoons for the average Right pair.
Finding 4 is only useful if it serves as the predictor for wealth-maximizing, rulefollowing behavior among Civil sextuplets, which is our next finding.
Finding 5 (Civil Sextuplet Hypothesis): Civil sextuplets throw fewer deadweight loss harpoons
than Right and Rude sextuplets for periods 21-26.
Evidence: Using a Wilcoxon rank sum test, we reject the null hypothesis of an equal number of
deadweight loss harpoons in favor of the alternative of fewer deadweight loss harpoons in Civil
than in Right (U6,6 = 29, p-value = 0.0465, one-sided test) and in Rude (U6,6 = 27.5, p-value =
0.0660, one-sided test). On average, a Civil sextuplet throws 9.3 deadweight loss harpoons per
session over the last 6 periods with right whales, whereas Right and Rude sextuplets each throw
29.3 such harpoons over the same time period.26
Finding 1c reports no significant difference in the number of fast-fish, loose-fish and iron
holds the whale harpoon throws in the Right treatment. But as Figure 4 suggests, Right sessions
are either wealth-maximizing or they are not. Right whalers who are not wealth-maximizing
may throw costly iron holds the whale harpoons, but what about Civil whalers who we know
from Finding 5 are wealth-maximizing? Naturally, we ask whether Civil whalers in the Sort
treatment throw more fast-fish, loose-fish than iron holds the whale harpoons at right whales.
Our next result strongly finds this to be the case.
Finding 6 (Civil Fast-Fish, Loose-Fish Hypothesis): With right whale prey Civil sextuplets
throw more fast-fish, loose-fish than iron holds the whale harpoons.

26

Yes, the total number of deadweight loss harpoons is exactly the same in Right and Rude over these six periods.
This observation together with Finding 5 suggests the strong degree to which a few bad apples can spoil the whole
barrel and confirms that our choice of six subjects per sessions is successful in generating conditions for amorphy.
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Evidence: Using a Wilcoxon signed rank test, we reject the null hypothesis of equal number of
fast-fish, loose-fish and iron holds the whale harpoons in favor of the alternative of more fastfish, loose-fish harpoons in Civil (W6 = 20, p-value = 0.0312, one-sided). Of all the nondeadweight loss harpoons that are thrown for periods 21-26, the Civil sessions respectively throw
fast-fish, loose-fish harpoons 84.5%, 82.4%, 33.8%, 81.3%, 88.2%, and 94.4% of the time.
Taken together, Findings 1c and 6 support Ellickson’s hypothesis on the adoption of
wealth-maximizing norms and they highlight the importance of group selection.

So while we

could only conclude from Finding 1 that the ecology matters in whether a social order forms, we
could not conclude what the content of the rule system is that the three wealth-maximizing
groups implemented. Finding 6 reports that civil-minded subjects rather convincingly adopt, as
hypothesized, the rule of fast-fish, loose-fish.
Although we did not initially recognize the importance of Ellickson’s implicit assumption
that whalers were survivors of a process that selected for people who abided by customary rules
of behavior, our laboratory experiment demonstrates that some groups of individuals may be, at
least as a group, simply ill-suited to hunt whales. If the subjects in the three inefficient Right
sessions had been actual 18th or 19th century whalers, their “rude” behavior would have put them
out of business. Or they would have realized that whaling was for them an inferior means of
earning a living, and they would have self-selected into an occupation more suited to their
temperament.
Our sorting mechanism unbeknownst to the subjects mimics this process in our
laboratory.

As in nearly every economic experiment, they have no outside option in the

experiment for earning money, nor any enforcement mechanism to minimize deadweight losses
except the threat of retaliation (which only causes further deadweight loss). Indeed, a whaling
community following fast-fish, loose-fish or iron holds the whale is unstable under defection or
invasion by unruly outsiders. Hence, the importance of cultivating order via the composition of a
community.

Jaworski and Wilson (2009) illustrate the importance of endogenous group

selection for the formation of property rights. In our Sort treatment, we draw upon the lessons
from Jaworski and Wilson, Ellickson, and our first two treatments by incorporating an
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endogenous group selection mechanism.27 Consequently, the results from Finding 6 support our
Ex Ante Hypothesis.
Having created Civil and Rude groups via a wealth-maximizing metric, we now examine
the responses of these groups to an ecological change in prey and assess the implications of the
general wealth-maximizing hypothesis.
Finding 7a (Ellickson Hypothesis): For Civil sextuplets, there is a structural break in the
number of deadweight loss harpoons thrown when the prey changes from right to sperm whales.
Evidence: For our quantitative evidence we employ a Chow (1960) test on an OLS regression of
the average number of deadweight loss harpoons (across the six sessions) on a constant and the
period. The results are reported in Table 4. For the Civil treatment average as a whole, we reject
the null hypothesis of no structural break in period 27 in favor the alternative of a structural
break at the 99% level of confidence (F2,22 = 19.20 > F2.01
, 22 = 5.72). We also conduct this test for
each individual session. Civil3, -5 and -6 all have statistically significant structural breaks at the
99% and 95% levels of confidence, respectively. The remaining three sessions are insignificant.
Figure 6 plots the number of deadweight loss harpoons for the treatment as a whole and for the
two subsets of sessions that do and do not have structural breaks at the session level. In the top
two panels there is a statistically significant negative slope with right whales followed by a
statistically significant and positive slope with sperm whales. Notice also that the variance starts
low in the early periods of sperm whales, but then increases strikingly toward the end of the
sessions. While the three other sessions do not have upward trends with sperm whales, the
variance is increasing, which is perhaps an indicator that a (statistically significant) breakdown
may be coming later for these sessions (see panel (c) in Figure 6).
The chat transcripts for the final two periods of Civil6 exemplify the breakdown in the
social order and a yearning for the order of periods past:
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We are using the term group selection in the cultural, not biological sense of the term.

Orchid: what happended to the pack olive?
Brown: olive how do you theif?
Pink: why is brown really red
Olive: the rules of the game seemed to have
changed, as I noticed from pink
Orchid: how so?
Brown: OUCH
Khaki: yeah i notived that too
Olive: it seems the last person (usually) to touch
gets the ball
Brown: i am not commie
Khaki: lol

Olive: well maybe not, I'm not so sure.
Pink: it seems as if i have started an all out war
Orchid: just keep to the old rules
Brown: i think it was better before
Pink: my bad
Olive: okay
Orchid: k
Khaki: yeah i liked it when it was just 2 ppl
Olive: haha
Orchid: true
Gray: the good ol' days

The wealth-maximizing hypothesis of endogenous rule-governed behavior predicts that
the rules of capture for right whales will be ill-suited for sperm whales. Finding 7a supports this
hypothesis with Civil sextuplets. Finding 7b assesses the implications of the hypothesis for the
counterfactual circumstances of counter-sociable groups.
Finding 7b (Ellickson Counterhypothesis): For five of six of the Rude sextuplets, there are no
structural breaks in the number of deadweight loss harpoons thrown when the prey changes from
right to sperm whales.
Evidence: Table 5 reports the F-statistics for a Chow tests by session of an OLS regression of
the average number of deadweight loss harpoons on a constant and the period. Save Rude3, all
are highly insignificant. Panel (a) in Figure 7 plots the average number of deadweight loss
harpoons for these five sessions.

There is no structural break in their wealth-maximizing

behavior because there is no such behavior to begin with. As their treatment name suggests, they
are as Ferguson describes them, “a band of robbers, who prey without restraint, or remorse, on
their neighbors” (1767, p. 83). An implicit assumption of the counterhypothesis is that preying
without restraint or remorse will not lead to the emergence of wealth-maximizing rules of
capture within periods 14-26. Rude3 demonstrates that this assumption is not uniformly true.
Despite starting period 14 with 12 deadweight loss harpoons thrown, that number steadily falls to
just one deadweight loss harpoon in periods 25 and 26 (see Figure 7). When the prey switches to
sperm whales, they remain well-behaved with no deadweight loss harpoons for several periods,
which is a structural break because they can not improve any more until the end of the session
when their number of deadweight loss harpoons slightly increases. Rude3 is the proverbial
exception that proves the rule; it looks more like Civil1, -2, and -4 with sperm whales than its
treatment counterparts.
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Having found striking direct and indirect support for both the wealth-maximizing rule
hypothesis and its counterhypothesis, we conclude this section with our final result on the
auxiliary hypothesis and auxiliary counterhypothesis.
Finding 8 (Auxiliary Ellickson Hypothesis and Counterhypothesis): The usage of iron holds
the whale harpoons is constant in Civil sextuplets and decreases in Rude sextuplets.
Evidence: We employ a simple OLS regression of average number of iron holds the whale
harpoons in the Civil and Rude subtreatments on a constant and the period, for periods 14-39.
The results are reported in Table 6. There is no significant trend in the Civil regression across
the whale types (p-value = 0.1723), and hence the regression explains almost nothing (R2 =
7.6%). In contrast, the Period covariate is highly significant (p-value < 0.0001) and explains
58.3% of the variance of the dependent variable. Figure 8 plots the average (scaled) number of
harpoons thrown in the Civil and Rude subtreatments, and Figures 9 and 10 the same plots at the
session level. While the number of iron holds the whale harpoons is increasing in some Civil
sessions, decreasing in others, and constant in others still, the strength of this finding rests in the
Rude sextuplets, save for Rude1 which looks more like Civil1, -2, and -4.
While the usage of iron holds the whale harpoons is not increasing in the Civil
sessions, it is also not decreasing as it is in the Rude sessions. This suggests that Civil whalers
may be on the path to adopting a new wealth-maximizing rule of capture to fit their new
ecological environment. The process by which norms of behavior change is undoubtedly long
and tedious. Yet the Civil whalers, unlike their Rude counterparts, appear not to be headed in the
wrong direction.

V. Discussion and Conclusion
Economists tend to think of property as a relationship between things and people, when
instead property is a system of relational rules between people involving things (Stake, 2004).
This subtle change in focus obscures the ultimate impetus for developing rules of property:
minimizing the negative sum costs of conflict over competition for resources. Moreover, when
the focus shifts away from rules of good and proper behavior among people to rules that assign
things to people, the idea of the legal centralism follows quite readily. Rules, it seems, must be
deliberately created to determine what is right regarding an individual and his or her things, and
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the state appears to be the sole available option to do the instituting and enforcing of such rules.
Legal centralism assumes away conflict as the impetus for property because the state has a
monopoly on the use of violence.
But this gets things the wrong way.28 When people have a common understanding of the
right and wrong ways to behave, rules governing behavior can emerge by agreement to avoid
particular conflicts of time and place. This approach to understanding property has a rich and
long intellectual tradition that predates the Enlightenment (Buckle, 1991). Samuel Pufendorf, a
17th century German jurist-philosopher, is one such precursor who laid out the foundations for
the origins of property that we explore in our experiment. His theory begins with the antecedent
circumstance of “communion”, which is
taken either negatively, or positively. In the former manner things are said to be common, as
consider’d before any human Act or Agreement had declared them to be belong to one rather than
to another. In the same sense, things thus consider’d are said to be No Body’s, rather negatively,
than privatively, i.e that they are not yet assign’d to any particular Person, not that they are
incapable of being so assign’d. They are likewise term’d res in medio quibusvis exposita, Things
that lie free for any Taker (1672, Book IV, Chapter IV, Section II).

Whales are such things that “lay free to any that would use, and do not belong to one more than
another”, and moreover, whalers are members of a negative as opposed to a positive community
in that no one can be excluded from taking a whale (IV.IV.V). The problem is that even though
man is capable of “Kindness by the Furtherance of mutual Good”, he is also “often malicious,
insolent, and easily provok’d, and as powerful in effecting Mischief, as he is ready in designing
it” (II.III.XV).
In this paper we present an experiment that explores Pufendorf’s ecological preconditions
for property, namely, a negative community without any exogenously enforced rules of capture
populated with agonists with a propensity for mischief and petulance.29 As Pufendorf explains,
“it was left to the Reason of Men to determine what measures should be taken to prevent Discord
that might arise amongst them” (IV.IV.III). Likewise we find in our virtual communities, that
many of our participants desire rules to prevent discord:
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Julius Paulus, the third century Roman jurist, astutely put it this way: “What is right is not derived from the rule,
but the rule arises from our knowledge of what is right” (quoted in Hayek, 1978, p.72, 162).
29
The following representative exclamations attest that we have replicated such mischievousness in our experiment:
“you’re all a bunch of crooks”, “o! damn the heathen”, “we(’)re turning into vultures”, “It’s a madhouse! A
madhouse!”, “this is madness”, “I’m gonna have nightmares about this tonight”, and “This is like lord of the flies,
they leave us to fend for ourselves, lol”.
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Rude2, Periods14-15
Green: should we be trying to help each other?
Green: or is selfishness the way to go?
Pink: that’s a super good plan
…
Pink: if everyone just agrees to not steal other peoples then we will get more
Blue: that is very true
Green: I think so too
Brown: true
Green: I'm down
Pink: so just do that
Civil4, Period14
Brown: hey guys
Green: hey
Brown: if we dont steal from each other
Brown: we make more money
Orange: yeah
Brown: i dont know how you guys feel about that
Brown: we lost 2 full circles
Brown: from competing

But what exactly does the generic rule “don’t steal” mean in practice and how does a community
come to agree on the rules?

Agreement cannot be assumed, for different people may have

different ideas of what the rule “don’t steal” means, as the following conversation in Civil4
plainly indicates:
Green: omg teal30
Green: u saw i had that one
…
Green: teal
Green: give me half
Green: that was mine
Green: it was green
…
Teal: u lost it so i have to get it
(Teal does not transfer any money to Green.)

Green is following iron holds the whale and expecting at least half of the whale for striking it
with a colored harpoon, but Teal is following fast-fish, loose-fish and will have nothing of it.
Ellickson’s hypothesis is that the ecological conditions of the community shape the
content of rules so as to maximize wealth, and this shaping process is what this paper examines.
“Vulture-like,” “greedy” or “selfish” (as undesirable attributes) are defined only with respect to
the emergence of rules by consent that are appropriate to the circumstances. We find that simply

30

For those unfamiliar with instant messaging shorthand, “omg” means “oh my god!”.

31
imposing two different ecological conditions and randomly allocating participants to them is
insufficient to observe the two different rules of capture for right and sperm whales that
Ellickson postdicts. Another factor is essential, namely that the members of the community are
civil-minded from the outset. In a civil as opposed to a rude community, no one considers his or
her own interest superior to another. Harmony in a civil community is then possible, not by
agreement on outcomes, but by agreement on the rules for pursuing one’s own interest.

By

type-casting early actions as civil and rude and sorting people accordingly into Civil and Rude
communities, we observe some two hundred years after the glory days of Anglo-American
whaling that civil-minded communities more broadly employ a fast-fish, loose-fish rule than
their insolent, mischievous counterparts. Moreover, for prey that moves faster and fights harder
we find that (a) changing the ecological conditions of a Civil community leads to a breakdown in
the usefulness of the fast-fish, loose-fish rule, and that (b) the rule of iron holds the whale
decreases in usage in our counterfactual Rude communities.
Pufendorf brilliantly anticipates by more than three centuries that which Ellickson
explains ex post and we explore ex ante on the origins of property:
in affirming that Men left this [negative] Communion upon the advice and direction of Reason, we
pretend not that it was necessary all things should be appropriated in the same Moment; but
according as the Temper or Condition of Men, the Nature of the things themselves, and the
difference of Place required; and as was judg’d most convenient for the cutting off all manner of
Quarrel or Dissension (IV.IV.XIII, emphasis added).

The implications for economics and law are far-reaching. For if property evolves in stages
through a process circumscribed by the current ecological circumstances of time and place and
the particular civil mindset of the people in question, then the history of property is necessarily
path dependent. Modern discussions of property by economists tend to focus on the benefits of
property rights and wrongs once they are established, but what Pufendorf clearly articulates
about the origins of property and what we too hence rediscover in our experiment is that there is
a necessary precondition that people are predisposed towards cutting off all manner of quarrel or
dissension.

Both ecology and civility are mainsprings of property.

This paper lays the

foundation for exploring the steps of moving from resource extraction in a negative community,
to resource cultivation in a positive community in which those outside the group are excluded by
right from the goods in question, and then finally to a system of private property that further
increases the industry of people with the strongest of all incentives—reaping the rewards of
one’s own efforts.

32
References
Bentham, Jeremy. 1802. The Theory of Legislation, C.K. Ogden (ed.). Kegan, Paul, Trench,
Trubner & Co.: London, UK. (1931)
Buckle, Stephen. 1991. Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Clay, Karen and Gavin Wright. 2005. “Order Without Law? Property Rights during the
California Gold Rush,” Explorations in Economic History, 42: 155–183.
Cooper, David J. and John Kagel. 2005. “Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus
Individual Play in Signaling Games,” American Economic Review, 95(3): 477-509.
Chow, Gregory C. 1960. “Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear
Regressions.” Econometrica, 28(3): 591–605.
Crockett, Sean, Vernon L. Smith, and Bart J. Wilson. 2009. “Exchange and Specialisation as a
Discovery Process.” Economic Journal, 119(539): 1162-1188.
Davis, Lance E., Robert E. Gallman, and Karin Gleiter. 1997. In Pursuit of Leviathan:
Technology, Institutions, Productivity, and Profits in American Whaling, 1816-1906.
University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL.
Demsetz, Harold. 1967. “Toward a Theory of Property Rights.” American Economic Review
(Papers and Proceedings), 57(2): 347-359.
Dolin, Eric Jay. 2007. Leviathan: The History of Whaling in America. WW Norton: New York,
NY.
Ellickson, Robert C. 1989. “A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 5(1): 83-97.
Ellickson, Robert C. 1991. Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Harvard
University Press: Cambridge, MA.
Ferguson, Adam. 1767. An Essay on the History of Civil Society, Eighth Edition. Hard Press:
Unknown (ISBN 13: 9781406936933). (2007)
Galanter, Marc. 1981. “Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law.”
Journal of Legal Pluralism, 18, 1-47.
Gunnthorsdottir, Anna, Daniel Houser, and Kevin McCabe. 2007. “Disposition, History and
Contributions in Public Goods Experiments.” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 62(2): 304-315.
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1978. Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1: Rules and Order. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.

33
Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. “Anarchy and its Breakdown.” Journal of Political Economy, 103, 26–
52.
Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. (1996)
Hume, David. 1740. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press: New York. (2000)
Jaworski, Taylor and Bart J. Wilson. 2009. “Go West Young Man: Self-selection and
Endogenous Property Rights,” Economic Science Institute working paper, Chapman
University.
Johnson, Samuel. 1755. A Dictionary of the English Language. CD-roms 1&3 of 3. Oakland,
CA: Octavo. (2005)
Kimbrough, Erik O., Vernon L. Smith, and Bart J. Wilson. 2010. “Exchange, Theft, and the
Social Formation of Property,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 74(3): 206229.
Latour, Bruno. 1999. “Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World,” in The Science Studies
Reader, M. Biagioli (ed.). Routledge: New York.
McCloskey, Deirdre. 2010. Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern
World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Polanyi, Michael. 1958. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Pufendorf, Samuel. 1672. Of the Law of Nature and Nations: Eight Books. The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd: Clark, NJ (2005).
Rigdon, Mary L., Kevin A. McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith. 2007. “Sustaining Cooperation in
Trust Games.” Economic Journal, 117(522): 991-1007.
Sened, Itai. 1997. The Political Institution of Private Property. Cambridge University Press:
New York, NY.
Stake, Jeffrey E. 2004. “The Property ‘Instinct’.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London: Biological Sciences, 359: 1763-1774.
Umbeck, John. R. 1977. “The California Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights.”
Explorations in Economic History, 14: 197-226.
Weber, Roberto A. 2006. “Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large
Groups.” American Economic Review, 96(1): 114-126.

34

Table 1. Summary of Parameters for Right and Sperm Treatments
Parameter
Probability of successful 1st strike (q)
Probability of successful subsequent strike (θ)
Probability of death after 1st strike (d)
Probability of death after subsequent strike (δ)
Expected number of harpoons (h) to pull in a whale*
Whale Speed
Whale Speed reduction after 1st strike
Whale Speed reduction after 2nd strike
Whaler Speed
Value of whole whale
Portion allocated to m successful whalers
Cost of regular harpoon
Cost of colored harpoon
Diameter of harpoon range
Diameter of sight
Number of whales per pair (periods 1-13)
Number of whales per sextuplet (periods 14-26)
Cash endowment (to buy harpoons for period 1)
Length of Gathering (Phase A)
Length of Interim (Phase B)
Time to pull in
Time to cool down
*E (h) = 1 ⋅ q + 2 ⋅ [d (1 − q ) + (1 − q)(1 − d )θ ]
+ (1 − q)(1 − d )(1 − θ )

∞

∑ n[δ (1 − δ )
n =3

n −3

Right
.75
.90
.25
.50
≈1.2697

Sperm
.25
.75
.10
.25
≈1.9577

50 pixels/sec
.75
.50
25 pixels/sec

75 pixels/sec
.75
.50
25 pixels/sec

100¢
1/m2

100¢
1/m2

10¢
20¢
175 pixels
325 pixels
4
10
150¢

10¢
20¢
175 pixels
325 pixels
4
10
150¢

90 seconds
90 seconds
5 seconds
5 seconds

90 seconds
90 seconds
5 seconds
5 seconds

(1 − θ ) n −3 + (1 − δ ) n − 2 (1 − θ ) n −3θ ]

35

Table 2. Transfers of Whales and Cash by Session for Periods 14-26
Right treatment

Sperm treatment

26

Right1
Right2
Right3
Right4
Right5
Right6
Average

Total Revenue
10,364¢
10,772¢
12,133¢
12,133¢
10,670¢
9,239¢
10,885¢

∑

26

wt + ct

463¢
0¢
0¢
0¢
38¢
0¢
83.5¢

∑w + c
t

t =14

Sperm1
Sperm2
Sperm3
Sperm4
Sperm5
Sperm6
Average

Total Revenue
11,316¢
9,631¢
10,723¢
10,205¢
9,748¢
10,040¢
10,277¢

t

t =14

1,061¢
2¢
0¢
562¢
0¢
2,770¢
732.5¢

Table 3. Summary of Parameters for Right and Sort Treatments
Parameter
Probability of successful 1st strike
Probability of successful subsequent strike
Probability of death after 1st strike
Probability of death after subsequent strike
Expected number of harpoons to pull in a whale

Right
Periods 1-26
.75
.90
.25
.50
≈1.2697

Sort (Right whales)
Periods 1-26
.75
.90
.25
.50
≈1.2697

Sort (Sperm whales)
Periods 27-39
.25
.75
.10
.25
≈1.9577

Whale Speed
Whale Speed reduction after 1st strike
Whale Speed reduction after 2nd strike
Whaler Speed

50 pixels/sec
.75
.50
25 pixels/sec

50 pixels/sec
.75
.50
25 pixels/sec

75 pixels/sec
.75
.50
25 pixels/sec

100¢
1/m2

60¢
1/m2

60¢
1/m2

Cost of regular harpoon
Cost of colored harpoon
Diameter of harpoon range
Diameter of sight
Number of whales per pair (periods 1-13)
Number of whales per sextuplet
Cash endowment (to buy harpoons for period 1)

10¢
20¢
175 pixels
325 pixels
4
10
150¢

6¢
12¢
175 pixels
325 pixels
4
10
90¢

6¢
12¢
175 pixels
325 pixels
NA
10
NA

Length of Gathering (Phase A)
Length of Interim (Phase B)
Time to pull in
Time to cool down

90 seconds
90 seconds
5 seconds
5 seconds

90 seconds
60 seconds
5 seconds
5 seconds

90 seconds
60 seconds
5 seconds
5 seconds

Value of whole whale
Portion allocated to m successful whalers
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Table 4. Estimated Linear Regressions for Civil Deadweight Loss Harpoons
Coefficient
Civil (all)
Constant
Period

Periods
14-39

p-value

Periods
14-26

p-value

Periods
26-39

p-value

20.36
-0.33

<0.0001
0.0334

44.16
-1.53

<0.0001
0.0006

-16.16
0.78

0.0287
0.0020

0.0090
0.2873

4.77
-0.15

0.0575
0.1915

0.81
0.02

0.6783
0.7611

0.3437
0.1646

1.04
0.04

0.5598
0.6166

-3.63
0.18

0.2766
0.0892

0.0042
0.0374

16.18
-0.67

0.0043
0.0116

-3.22
0.14

0.1721
0.0662

0.0240
0.2360

5.89
-0.23

0.0478
0.1111

5.18
-0.12

0.0670
0.1536

F2,22

19.20

Civil1
Constant
Period

2.45
-0.03

F2,22

1.15

Civil2
Constant
Period

0.86
0.05

F2,22

1.23

Civil3
Constant
Period

6.10
-0.15

F2,22

6.69

Civil4
Constant
Period

2.61
-0.05

F2,22

2.01

Civil5
Constant
Period
F2,22
Civil6
Constant
Period
F2,22

9.86
-0.28

0.0000
0.0002

16.69
-0.62

0.0016
0.0098

-2.83
0.11

0.1695
0.0921

0.2435
0.0078

-0.41
0.09

0.8575
0.4084

-12.46
0.46

0.0102
0.0031

6.18
-1.52
0.13
4.48
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Table 5. Chow Test Statistics for Deadweight Loss Harpoons by Rude Session
Rude1
Rude2
Rude3
Rude4
Rude5
Rude6
F2.05
, 22

F2,22
1.78
1.53
17.29
1.46
1.80
1.60
3.44

Table 6. Estimated Linear Regressions for Iron Holds the Whale Harpoons for
Periods 14-39
Coefficient
Constant
Period
R2
Obs.

Civil
Estimate p-value
4.33

<0.0001

-0.03
7.6%
26

0.1723

Rude
Estimate p-value
4.98
-0.08
58.3%
26

<0.0001
<0.0001

38

Panel (a). Gathering Phase

Panel (b). Interim Phase
Figure 1. Screenshots for the Gathering and Interim Phases
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Figure 4. Summary of Right and Sperm Treatments
Note: The total height of the bar is the number of deadweight loss harpoons thrown over periods 21-26, and the red and blue
areas report the relative percentage of non-deadweight loss harpoons for periods 21-26.

Figure 5. Snapshot of Fast-fish, Loose-fish at Work in Right4
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Note: The portion of μ − 2σ that falls below zero is added to μ + 2σ .
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Appendix A. Experiment Instructions (Not necessarily for publication)
<Page 1>
Welcome
You will be participating in an economics experiment. The choices you make while in this
experiment can earn you money, which will be paid to you in cash at the conclusion of the
experiment.
In this experiment, you will be a Red/Blue/Green/Teal/Orange/Purple person. You and 5
other people will be gathering circles over the course of several periods. Each period consists of
two phases: the gathering phase and the interim phase.
<Page 2>
Gathering Phase
During the 90-second gathering phase, the middle of the screen will display a gathering area,
where each person is represented by a stick figure. Circles will randomly appear and move
around this area. To move your stick figure around, left click anywhere in the gathering area
and your figure will move to that spot. Do this now.
To gather circles, you must throw out a line from your stick figure to a moving circle. To do
this, right click anywhere in the gathering area. If you right click on a circle, your figure will
throw a line to that circle and attempt to catch it. You cannot throw out a line beyond the
colored circle surrounding you stick figure. (You cannot do this until the experiment begins.)
<Page 3>
Gathering Phase (continued)
After successfully striking a circle with a line, it will take 5 seconds for you to attempt to catch
it. The computer will determine randomly whether you were successful in catching the circle. If
you are successful, it will appear in your cargo area located around the border of the gathering
area. The cargo boxes of the other people in the experiment also displayed here.
After you use a line, you will have to wait 5 seconds before you can throw another one. During
this time you will still be able to move around but you will be unable to throw lines.
<Page 4>
Gathering Phase (continued)
The Status Bar along the bottom of the screen will keep you updated with the events of the
gathering phase.
On the top right side, you will see the number of lines that you have left. There are two types of
lines, regular and colored which can be selected by using the appropriate radio button next to
them. Both lines work in the same way with one exception. If you hit a circle with a colored
line, the circle will turn your color whether or not the computer determines you are successful in
catching it.
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<Page 5>
Gathering Phase (continued)
More than one person may attempt to catch a circle at the same time. If more than one person is
successful in catching a circle, each successful person will receive only fraction of the circle,
where the sum of the individual fractions is less than the whole circle. Each person receives
1/n2, where n is the number of people successful in catching the circle. The remaining portions
of a circle that no one receives are displayed in the ‘Portions Lost’ area at the bottom of the
screen.
The value of a circle is displayed under the circle in the cargo area. All whole circles will have a
starting value of 100¢.
If your line hits a circle, but you are not successful in catching it, the circle will move away from
you, but at a slower pace. Others can attempt to catch the circle as it moves away from you.
<Page 6>
Interim Phase
Between gathering phases is a 90-second an interim phase. During the interim phase you are
free to talk with the other people in the experiment. Type your message in the bottom of the chat
area, and then press ENTER or click the SEND button. (You cannot do this until the experiment
begins.)
You are free to discuss any and all aspects of the experiment, with the following exceptions: you
may not reveal your name, discuss side payments <outside the laboratory>, make threats, or
engage in inappropriate language (including such shorthand as ‘WTF’). If you do, you will be
excused and you will forfeit your earnings.
<Page 7>
Interim Phase (continued)
To convert your gathered circles into earnings you must move them to the Buyer on the right
side of the screen. Your cumulative earnings are displayed in the lower right.
To move a circle, first Left click to select a circle (it will become highlighted in yellow). Then
with the Right mouse button depressed, drag the circle to move it. Do this now. If you have a
question, please raise your hand.
If you move a circle to another person’s cargo area, the circle will be transferred to them. (You
cannot do this until the experiment begins.)
At the end each interim phase any circles remaining in the cargo box will disappear.
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<Page 8>
Interim Phase (continued)
Money can also be moved in the same way as circles. First click on the ¢ tab in your cargo area
and then left click on the desired amounts to add them to your selected total. Then right click
and drag your selected total to another cargo area. That money will be transferred from you to
the other player.
You may also purchase additional lines by clicking on the BUY button next to the type of line
you would like to purchase. The cost of the lines is taken out of your earnings. You will be
given an initial allotment of lines. After that you will be able to purchase colored lines for 20¢
and regular lines for 10¢.
Buy 5 colored and 5 regular lines now. If you have a question, please raise your hand.
<Page 9>
This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions or if you have not purchase any
lines or if you have not redeemed a circle, please raise your hand and a monitor will come by.
If you are finished with the instructions please press Start. The instructions will remain on your
screen until the experiment starts.
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Appendix B. Content Analysis Procedures and Results (Not for publication)
In this appendix we examine the chat room transcripts from the Interim phase. Actions
may speak louder than words, but this analysis—though noisy—provides a richer picture of the
subjects’ mindsets and behavior than harpoon categorizing. In particular, it reveals that subjects
are concerned with deadweight loss, highlights the behavioral norms they adopt, and also
importantly those they do not adopt.
Following Cooper and Kagel’s (2005) procedure for analyzing dialogue from entry limit
pricing games, we surveyed chat transcripts and developed separate sets of codes that were then
reconciled to the single list presented in Table B1. Several of the codes reference norms
identified by Ellickson (1987). In some cases minor changes to the content of these norms were
dictated by the specifics of our experimental environment.
Seven undergraduate research assistants unfamiliar with the objectives of the research
project were trained to code the chat room transcripts after participating in an abbreviated session
with each other and without payment.31 If an individual line of chat corresponded to a particular
code, they tagged it once with that code. If a single line of chat corresponded to several different
codes it was tagged multiple times with the relevant codes. The decision to code individual lines
of chat rather than multiple line dialogues was made to avoid a problem identified in Cooper and
Kagel, namely, in which experimental period should a dialogue extending over several such
periods be recorded? In another departure from Cooper and Kagel, the codings of separate
research assistants were not averaged or correlated. Rather, the coders were split into three
initial groups: two pairs and one group of three. Each group coded all eighteen sessions. Then,
as one group of seven, they went back through each session and reached a line-by-line
consensus. It is this consensus that we report in Figure B1 below.

31

The document used to train coders is available upon request.
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Table B1. Chat Code Descriptions
Code
1
2
3*
4*
5*
6*
7*
8*
9
10a
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21b

Description
Subject (mentions/has/is)…
Aware of/concerned about deadweight loss
Aware of/concerned about complicated/costly norms
Norm: Possession-decides
Norm: Fresh pursuit
Norm: Reasonable prospect
Norm: Fast-fish, loose-fish
Norm: Iron holds the whale
Norm: Split ownership (e.g. 50/50)
Norm: Spatial (e.g. territories, zones, split screen)
Norm: Everyone for him/herself
Norm: Turn taking
Norm: Non-specific teamwork
Norm: Other
Belief: colored lines useless
Belief: colored lines serve purpose
Reports or promotes cooperation
Disapproves of another subject’s action
Disapproves of another subject’s action (names names)
Reports norm violation
Apology for an accidental click
Correctly surmises a change in circle movement
* From Ellickson (1989)
a
Explicit norm as opposed to all-for-all behavior in the absence
of any norm
b
Only applies to periods 27-39 of the Sort sessions
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Appendix C. Comments by Readers and Our Responses (Not for publication)
Comment: The situation in the experiment strongly reminds me of a chicken game (or a war of
attrition). If both players insist on getting their favorite outcome, they are going to get badly hurt.
Hence the need to find some kind of rule that avoids mis-coordination.
Response: Both the Chicken game and war of attrition are used to model competition for a
resource, but that’s where the similarity ends (see chapters 2 and 3 in Evolution and the Theory
of Games by Maynard Smith). One of the severe limitations of abstracting competition over a
resource as a game of chicken is that the game of chicken assumes that the two agonists are
equidistant from the resource and simultaneously taking actions to acquire the resource. But
even if we make those convenient assumptions, the task in this experiment is not a game of
chicken. If an agonist does not throw a harpoon at a whale that both he and the second agonist
have in their sights, he receives a zero payoff, but he has a positive expected payoff regardless of
whether the other agonist throws a harpoon. That game only has one pure strategy Nash
equilibrium, and the game of chicken has two pure strategy Nash equilibria. If the prisoners’
dilemma also springs to mind, that doesn’t apply here either. Both agonists throwing a harpoon
results in a positive expected sum of earnings, but zero total earnings if neither throws a harpoon.
Even if one were to find that rules can emerge in a decentralized way, this does not mean that
they did arise in this way.
Well, obviously we do not know nor claim this. Crockett et al. (2009) respond the same way to
the same question and then add:
It is like in the theory of evolution. We look at the ancient archaeological record and see mammals
coming in after the dinosaurs. These mammals change with many similarities so that it looks like
A followed B followed C in a evolutionary change process, but everywhere there are gaps, great
missing links, and puzzles, although there is circumstantial evidence for evolution. Now someone
does an experiment, takes some a cells passes them through a bunch of treatments alleged to
represent an evolutionary process, and in one sequence the a cells actually evolve into b cells. This
still does not “prove” evolutionary theory, but now we have an example and a technique and we
can address new questions with them. [Footnote: In economics you could ask the same naysaying
question of the theory, “How do you know that a particular market is represented by a competitive,
Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium?” You don’t and didn’t, but that did not nor should it have
prevented the theory from being developed.]

Legal centralists, however, have made such strong counterclaims. For example, Sened (1997)
declares that “governments must grant rights before they can protect them” (p. 6, original
emphasis). Ellickson is obviously an historical counterexample, for American courts explicitly
deferred to whaler customs to settle disputes.
The instructions appear to say that some statements were forbidden in the chat room. Why that?
Some of the forbidden statements are in fact interesting. For example those related to side
payments.
The exceptions are designed to limit the interactions to the confines of the laboratory and
included for ethical conduct of human subject experiments.
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The classification of rules in pages 12-14 seems fairly arbitrary. Have you tried some robustness
checks to alternative classification rules?
How is the classification arbitrary? We designed the experiment with the express purpose of
distinguishing between the two possible rules. Which condition for an iron holds the whale
harpoon would you reclassify as fast-fish, loose-fish and vice versa? And more importantly,
why?
Much better than interpreting the Civil groups as those which would have survived in the field,
you should have created surviving rules and let people know they existed and possibly adjust to
them.
We address this in footnote 22 and repeat it here:
Following Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and McCabe (2007) and Rigdon, McCabe, and Smith (2007),
we do not reveal to our subjects how their group is formed because our hypothesis is not about the
rules of capture that people develop when they know they are combined with two other pairs who
have the fewest or highest total number of strikes on attached whales in the previous six periods.
Rather, the question is what rules, if any, spontaneous emerge amongst six similarly disposed
people who happen to find themselves suddenly interacting with four other like-minded people.

A critical reader wants to know how representative the examples of subject chat are. Going
through subject chat one can find examples of probably most anything, including quotes that are
not representative of the collection of chats for this particular series of experiments.
In the context of this specific comment, a seminar participant mentioned to us that George Stigler
once quipped that “the plural of anecdote is data”. Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2008)
explain the value of the subject chat this way:
Quotations from these transcripts reveal the thoughts, beliefs, social attitudes, and experiential
interpretations of the participants in ways that the quantitative measures of their behavior, above,
cannot. The time-constrained subjects are busy interacting, implementing their choices; hence,
their conversation is free-flowing and relatively unguarded. The narratives are a fascinating
window into individual and group problem solving in real time (p.1025).

It would be foolish and dishonest for us to mischaracterize the conversations in our data set. The
raw chat data is available upon request.
Contrary to what the authors claim, this paper does not test the emergence of property rules in
general, but models the appropriation in a historical commons. It may not be easy to study the
real origin of the concept of property in laboratories, at least not without reference to early
human history and anthropological studies of societies that have less extensive concepts of
property to this day.
Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) also address this prosaic comment, which is worth
repeating here:
One previous reviewer commented as follows: “My greatest concern with the paper is that the
findings are likely to be specific to the particular experimental interface and thus provide little
insight on the origin of property rights in general” (emphasis added). Generalization is never
possible from empirical cases, but the sensitivity of findings to particular interfaces is a hypothesis
capable of being tested experimentally. No empirical study is context-free. Did the Maori of New
Zealand, the Cherokee of North America, and the 9th century settlers of Iceland live in a context-
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free world and develop property rights in general? No, they and everyone else interface with each
other in the contextual circumstances in which they live and construct their own social system of
property rights. Our objective is to ask how real people in the laboratory fail or succeed in
developing these constructions, and thereby improve our understanding of how such institutions
may evolve or fail to evolve in history. This is the methodology underlying Kimbrough et al.
(2008, p. 1029) and Crockett et al. (2009).

This is a common property resource experiment.
No, it is not, as we explain p. 9:
While our experiment does involve a resource that lays free to anyone that would capture it in an
open area, this superficial similarity to fishing does not mean, as readers have erroneously
asserted, that this is an experiment on the common pool resource problem. The central problem of
a common pool resource is overuse, i.e., a problem associated with how much of a resource is
extracted from a common pool. By design our resource fully replenishes each period because we
are interested in how people go about extracting a resource, i.e., we are investigating the more
limited but fundamental question of what system of rules, if any, emerges to delineate what is
yours from what is mine while extracting a constantly renewing resource.

The term “legal-centralist” is from Williamson – why not cite him?
No, the term goes back further. See footnote 1.
I object to discussing the data as though it is whaling data (circles as whales, etc., in Table 1 and
footnote 11). This approach misleads the readers by suggesting the experiment is a tight test of
Ellickson’s hypotheses.
The following statement could be found in any economics journal: Consider a market with
demand given by q = D(p). As part of the ordinary reading process, a reader comprehends the
equation q = D(p) by identifying the symbols used by the author— “q”, “=”,“D”, “(”,“p”, and “)”
— and by further knowing what they mean. What makes the symbol p simultaneously represent
the general concept of a price in a market and the specific amount of $3.45 that a customer paid
to Starbucks for a grande decaf latte last week? While purposively convenient, it’s not simply
because the symbol p is the first letter of the word “price”. An author could equivalently use the

Ö

Ö

statement “Consider a market with demand given by q = D(
)”, where the symbol
means
both a general and specific price. But she doesn’t. Why? Because the author assumes that the
both the reader and she share the goal of understanding what she intends to convey, and the

Ö

unfamiliar symbol
would make it difficult for the reader to understand the meaning of the
article. We too assume that the reader shares our goal of understanding our thesis, and to that
end, we use the word “whale” to represent the general concept of a whale that is hunted in the
17th and 18th centuries and the specific concept of a white circle that is mouse-clicked in our
laboratory experiment.
Forcing the reader to look to Appendix A rather than describe the experiment and its link to the
question seems annoying if not arrogant.
We do describe the experiment and its link to the question. We are merely suggesting, based
upon experience from conversations and seminars, that the reader understand the task from the
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perspective of the subject before tackling it at the level of the experimenter. The epistemic
conditions are noticeably and importantly different for this experiment.
The attachment to Pufendorf at the exclusion of Blackstone and other more important writers
signals a lack of understanding of the literature on ownership and possession rules. This
ignorance suggests a paper written for the purpose of creating a quick experiment rather than to
further our understanding of property institutions by using experimental methods.
“You didn’t pick my favorite writer on property. Gotcha!”
Yes, Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England is an important contribution to the
intellectual history of property, as are many, many other treatises on the subject. Hume is also a
particular favorite of ours, but neither Hume nor Blackstone spend as much time developing the
role that ecology and civility play in the emergence of property as a means to avoid conflict.
Why? Perhaps because they take Pufendorf’s thesis as a widely known starting point for their
own original discourses on property. Pufendorf was eminently known during the Enlightenment
and preceded Blackstone and Hume by a century.
To paraphrase Anton Ego from Ratatouille, it may be fun to write and to read that we’re
ignorant and our experiment “quick”, but the bitter truth is that, in the grand scheme of things,
the average piece of junk is more meaningful than criticism designating it so.
Any experiment intended to replicate a particular set of historical circumstances is vulnerable to
the criticism that something important has been omitted, and of course it would be completely
unfair to the authors to expect them to create an experiment that realistically encompasses all of
the tradeoffs faced by 19th century whalers. But I fear that something quite essential is missing
from this experiment, namely costly effort. In the absence of the rules of capture that emerged in
the industry, the temptation to pursue a strategy of “stealing” whales wounded or killed by other
boats would have been quite strong, much stronger than in a setting where capturing a whale
entailed little private cost.
The data in Figures 2, 3, and 10 indicate that such fears are unfounded. Our participants are in
fact quite “tempted to pursue a strategy of ‘stealing’ whales”, for the number of deadweight loss
harpoons can be a rather high percentage of the total number of harpoons thrown, even without
costly effort. Moreover, the results of the Sort treatment results show us that we don’t need an
explicit effort cost to (a) observe rules of property emerge in the Civil treatment and (b) fail to
observe them in the Rude treatment. And here’s the clincher. We also observe a subsequent
breakdown of these rules in the Civil treatment when the type of whales changes, again without
an explicit private cost of effort. The temptation is indeed present for someone to put their own
material interests above the interests of others by striking an attached whale, and many people
evidently give into that temptation. We also note that the harpoons were not free nor trivially
costly. A regular harpoon costs 10% of a whole whale and a colored harpoon 20%.
I am deeply skeptical of the authors’ strategy of selecting ‘civic-minded’ participants based on
their behavior in early rounds and then examining how they respond to a change in the
characteristics of their prey (p. 21). Does the lower level of free-riding during the rounds with
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only two participants have any bearing on this question? Do the money transfers between rounds
possibly create mechanisms for rewards or punishments?
First, to be clear, we do not use the word “civic” to describe our treatment. That word invokes
notions of citizenship and belonging to a governmental municipality. Rather, as we discuss in
footnote 21, we are using the word “civil” in the 18th century sense of “relating to a community
of men, or to a man as a member of community”. This is important distinction for understanding
a Pufendorfian precondition for rules of property, viz., each person in a social group must have
the communitarian temperament to not set his or her own material interest above the interest of
the others.
Secondly, the concept of “free-riding” is misleading and not applicable to our experiment.
Somebody latching onto a whale already attached to someone else reduces the total value of the
whale if they are both successful. So by design, a whale is a rivalrous good. Something must be
free for someone to “free-ride”.
Thirdly, how people behave in pairs has a direct bearing on the question of how people behave in
a community of six. Coming to an agreement on a rule of capture is a much simpler task with
one other person than with five other people. If the dyspeptic is unwilling to forego preying
without restraint or remorse in the more intimate and personal setting of a pair, the precondition
of civility becomes only more difficult to achieve in a sextuplet, particularly if there is more than
one robber in the group. The driving question is whether sorting based on pair behavior leads to
the sextuplets adopting the fast-fish, loose-fish rule, which we did not observe in the Right
treatment when a few bad apples spoiled the whole barrel in half of the sessions (1, 5, and 6).
The answer in Finding 6 is a resounding yes: Civil sextuplets throw more fast-fish, loose-fish
than iron holds the whale harpoons. Furthermore, as we report in Finding 5 Civil sextuplets
throw very few deadweight loss harpoons.
Lastly, in Finding 2 we directly answer the question of whether people use money transfers
between rounds as mechanisms for rewards and punishments: very little cash and very few
whales are redistributed among the whalers in the Interim period. Moreover, “none of the three
wealth-maximizing Right sessions (2, 3, and 4) transfer a single penny of earnings amongst each
other”, so evidently money transfers are not part of the solution (p. 17).
I don’t like Appendix C. If a paper is frequently misinterpreted, then probably the paper itself
should be edited so that it is easier to understand.
Fair enough, but the operative word in that statement is “probably”. Some of the burden in
understanding this paper rests with the reader. For example, in the preceding two comments, the
questioner overlooked direct answers in the main findings of the paper, set apart in bold and
italics no less. This appendix is not intended for publication. It is intended to highlight how easy
it is for naysayers to criticize a paper and risk nothing in doing so, and how difficult it is to
discover and defend the new.
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